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THE INTENTIONAL CREATION OF FETAL
TISSUE FOR TRANSPLANTS: THE WOMB
AS A FETUS FARM?
December 3, 1987 marked the twentieth anniversary of the first
successful human heart transplant.1 January 22, 1988 marked the
fifteenth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Roe v. Wade.2 Although these two events may once have seemed
unrelated, modern medical technology has advanced to a point
where an aborted fetus can now be used in transplant operations.'
Currently, however, the demand for organs to transplant into newborn infants far exceeds those available from suitable donors.4 In
addition, fetal tissues may be useful in the treatment of some adult
diseases.5 This demand has led some women to consider using their
rights to conceive and abort in order to produce these much needed
organs and tissues.6 Along with the medical advances that make the
intentional creation of human organs a reality come legal and moral
issues not yet squarely addressed. This comment will, therefore, apply existing legal theory to this evolving question in an effort to
avoid the morally unpleasant result of women intentionally conceiv1. Dr. Christian Barnard performed the first successful human heart transplant
at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. Stadtman, The First Transplant, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1983, at 43. In the operation, Dr. Barnard transplanted

the heart of a 25 year old woman who died in an auto accident into the body of a 55
year old man. The recipient lived for eighteen days before he died from pneumonia.

Id.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See infra notes 31-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roe v, Wade.
3. See Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead from the Dying, 17
HASTING CENTER REP. 5 (1987) (discussing the uses of fetal organs for transplantation
into infants); Mahowald, Silver & Ratcheson, The Ethical Options in Transplanting
Fetal Tissue, 17 HASTING CENTER REP. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Mahowald] (discussing
the uses of fetal organs for the treatment of diseases in adults). See also Chicago
Tribune, Dec. 9, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (parents' decision to donate organs of their
anencephalic fetus).
4. An estimated 400 to 500 infant hearts and kidneys and 500'to 1,000 infant
livers are needed each year in the United States. Capron, supra note 3, at 5. The
number of newborns who die under circumstances suitable to allow their organs to be
donated, however, is very few. Id.
5. Research suggests that fetal tissue may replace or repair damaged adult tissue. Mahowald, supra note 3, at 10. Researchers find fetal tissue especially beneficial
in transplant procedures because it is less immunologically reactive and, therefore,
the chance of tissue rejection is reduced. Id. Additionally, because fetal tissue is capable of rapid growth, it has a better chance of development than adult tissue. Id.
6. Although some women have already approached physicians with such requests, physicians have generally refused stating that the idea is medically and ethically unsound. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 20, 1987, at 48, col. 1.
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ing human life for the sole purpose of harvesting the fetus for spare
parts.
First, this comment reviews the current uses of the fetus, both
in transplants and in the treatment of diseases.' Second, this comment analyzes the definition of "abortion" according to the medical
terminology used by the Court in Roe v. Wade' and concludes that,
as a voluntary termination of her pregnancy' rather than feticide,1"
abortion also terminates a woman's maternal interest in the fetus. 1
Third, this comment argues that after disassociating herself from
the fetus by her decision to abort, a woman no longer has either
common law possessory interests in the aborted fetus or the statutory interests created by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 2 Instead, the state has both the right to protect the fetus and the right
to control the disposition of the fetal remains. Recognizing the
state's right to regulate the disposition of the fetus will permit society to retain the medical benefits of using fetal tissues, while avoiding the ethical dilemma posed by creating a fetus for the sole purpose of harvesting its tissue and organs. This comment therefore
concludes that while a woman's constitutional right to privacy includes the fundamental right to secure an abortion, it does not include the right to control the disposition of the fetus that she has
rejected by her decision to abort.
I. USES OF FETAL TISSUE
In recent years, science has made rapid advances in medical
technology." One result of these advances is that the aborted fetus
has become increasingly valuable. 4 There is a great demand for fe7. See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of diseases
which are currently treated with fetal tissue.
8. 410 U.S. at 163-65. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text discussing
the medical definitions of abortion used by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.
9. 410 U.S. at 153.
10. Feticide is legally defined as the "[destruction of the fetus; the act by
which criminal abortion is produced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559 (5th ed. 1979).

The medical definition of feticide is "[i]nduced abortion; embryectony; the destruction of the embryo or fetus in the uterus." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 516 (4th

ed. 1976).
11. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text discussing a woman's right to
procure an abortion.
12.

UNiI. ANATOMICAL GirT ACT 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983) [hereinafter U.A.G.A.]. See

infra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-56 for a discussion of recent advances in medical
technology.
14. There is a rapidly growing market for human fetuses, JAMES RIDGEWAY,

WHO OWNS THE EARTH? 148 (1980), and the United States is the largest purchaser of
fetal tissue. Id. The National Cancer Institute and the United States military use
these fetuses for research. Id. Research facilities use as many as 100,000 fetuses a
year. Id. In 1976, a human fetus was worth $75. Id.
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tuses not only because fetal tissues and organs have many uses in
experimentation, but also because the developing fetus has potential
value in the adoption market. 5 The fact that demand for fetal organs and tissues greatly exceeds the available supply makes the fetus even more valuable.1 This section of the comment discusses the
controversial donation of intentionally aborted fetuses for organ and
tissue transplants.
Recently doctors have begun using fetal tissue in transplant operations. Two specific uses have already caused considerable controversy. The first is the use of fetal tissue in the treatment of adult
diseases such as Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes. 7 This involves the transplantation of cells from an aborted fe15. A healthy fetus is increasingly valuable today because it represents a potential increase in the supply of babies at a time when there is a serious shortage of
healthy, white infants available for adoption. Posner, The Regulation of the Market
in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REV. 59, 65 (1987). The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade aggravated this shortage by leading to an increase in the number of legal abortions in
the United States from 600,000 in 1972 to 1,300,000 in 1983. Id. at 63 (citing CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., ABORTION SURVEILLANCE 1983, tab 1

(not yet published)). As a result, a significant number of infants who might otherwise
be put up for adoption are now aborted as fetuses. Id.
Simultaneous with this shortage of white, healthy infants, the demand for such
infants has increased, due in part to the recent trend of couples postponing
parenthood until their thirties. Id. at 61. At such a time, a couple is more likely to
have infertility problems. Id. This shortage in supply combined with increasing demand makes the fetus very valuable in today's adoption market.
As Posner notes, a market system for infants is already in operation. Id. at 60. A
black market operates for the selling of infants to those who can pay the price. In the
black market, the middleman often demands high prices to offset the risks of operating outside the law. Id. Independent adoptions, which are legally arranged through a
lawyer or obstetrician, also involve aspects of a sale in the fee paid by the adoptive
parents. Id. at 60. Independent adoptions are, therefore, often characterized as making up a "gray market" for the selling of babies. Id. Even adoption agencies charge
fees, which often are used in part to subsidize the maintenance of the natural mother.
Id. Judge Posner's controversial view on "baby selling" argues for actual deregulation
of the adoption market through the legalization and regulation of the black market,
thereby promoting a more efficient adoption market. Id. Posner suggests, that such a
system would provide the missing financial incentive for women to choose birth and
adoption instead of abortion. Id. at 63.
For a further discussion of Posner's proposed market system for adoptions see
Cass, Coping With Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the LawAnd-Economics Debate, 67 B.U.L. REV. 73 (1987). For a critical view of Posner's approach see Frankel and Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions,
67 B.U.L. REV. 99 (1987).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text discussing the availability of fetal
organs.
17. Parkinsonism, commonly known as Parkinson's disease, is defined as "1.
shaking or trembling palsy; spasmus agitans; a neurological syndrome usually resulting from arterioscleritoc changes in the basal ganglia and characterized by rhythmical
muscular tremors, rigidity of movement, festination, droopy posture, and masklike
faces." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1032 (24th ed. 1982).
Alzheimer's disease is defined as "dementia presenilis (presenile dementia) (2);
organic dementia occurring usually in persons under 50 years of age, associated with
Alzheimer's sclerosis, neurofibrillary degeneration, and senile plaques." Id. at 403.
Diabetes mellitus is "a chronic form of diabetes involving an insulin deficiency
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tus into an adult patient."8 This treatment is understandably controversial because it creates a temptation to conceive with the intent to
abort, thus ending a potential life for the benefit of another.19
and characterized by excess of sugar in the blood and urine, hunger, thirst, and gradual loss of weight. WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 501 (2d ed. 1972).
18. Research in the treatment of Parkinson's disease involves the transplantation of fetal brain tissues. Mahowald, supra note 3, at 10. The treatment requires
inducing an abortion and removing of the fetus in a way that will preserve the needed
tissue. Id. Cells from the fetal adrenal glands are then removed and transplanted into
the brain of the adult patient. Id. The transplanted fetal cells restore the chemical
balance in the adult patient's brain by secreting the chemical Dopamine. Id.
The first reported application of this treatment occurred on September 12, 1986.
The operation took place at the LaRaza Medical Center in Mexico City, Mexico. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 7, 1988, at 19, col. 1. In the operation, pieces of the adrenal gland
of a spontaneously aborted fetus were transplanted into the brains of a 50 year old
man and a 35 year old woman. Id. Both adults reportedly showed significant improvement within two weeks of the operation. Id.
In the treatment of Alzheimer's disease, United States researchers have transplanted fetal cells into the brains of mice. Mahowald, supra note 3, at 10. The fetal
cells have shown an ability to regenerate undamaged nerve fibers in the hippocampus,
the area of the brain affected by Alzheimer's disease. Id. The transplanted cells secrete acetylcholine, a memory enhancing substance that improved the learning and
memory abilities of the mice studied. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 20, 1987, at 48, col. 1.
Researchers hope to have similar success when the technique is applied to human
patients. Id.
In treating diabetes, researchers have transplanted the cells from fetal pancreases
into adult diabetics. Id. The adult patients were able to reduce their insulin injections
following the treatment. Id. Finally, researchers also hope that fetal tissues may help
regenerate damaged spinal cords. Mahowald, supra note 3, at 10.
19. The Hippocratic Oath, which is the foundation for medical ethics, states
that a physician should "first, do no harm." Comment, The Sale of Human Organs:
Implicating a Privacy Right, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 741, 749 (1987). This has touched off a
debate as to whether the removal of a non-vital organ from a healthy donor for transplantation constitutes unethical conduct. Id. See also Starzl, Will Live Organ Donations No Longer Be Justified? 15 HASTING CENTER REP. 5 (1985). This debate centers
on whether cutting into the healthy body of a live donor violates the medical ethics

embodied in the Oath. Comment, supra, at 749. The ending of one life by the removal of a vital organ for transplantation is, however, a clear violation of medical
ethics. See Id. In such a case, there can be no question that the physician has inflicted harm on the donor. Id.
According to the Hippocratic Oath, abortions performed solely for the purpose of
producing transplantable organs would also constitute a violation of medical ethics.
See Id. Such a procedure obviously inflicts harm on the fetus (since it is necessarily
destroyed), and the personal privacy justification relied on by the Roe Court for its
decision guaranteeing the right to an abortion is no longer present. The ethical violations presented in removing a healthy fetus to harvest its organs are even more evident because of the recent recognition by the medical community of the fetus as a
patient. See Lenow, The Fetus as a patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM.
J.L. & MED. 1 (1983-84).

The abortion of a healthy fetus with the intent to use its organs may also implicate the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. See Note,
The Brave New World: Can the Law Bring Order Within Traditional Concepts of
Due Process?, IV SUFFOLK UL. REV. 894, 901 n. 39 (1970). If a fetus is considered a
person for purposes of the thirteenth amendment, then a mother's destruction of her

fetus in order to secure its organs for transplants could constitute a violation of the
prohibition against involuntary servitude because her actions would be akin to ownership of the fetus. Id. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (held that fetus
is not a "person" for 14th amendment purposes).
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The second controversial use is the transplantation of whole organs from the aborted fetus.20 In addition to intentionally ending a
potential life for the benefit of another, the transplantation of whole
organs presents additional problems. First, in order to obtain the
whole organs needed for transplants, it is necessary to abort the fetus whole.2 However, it is often in the mother's best interest for the
fetus to be broken apart in the womb. This greatly lessens the risk
to a woman22 but is less likely to produce organs that are suitable
for transplants. Thus, a conflict may exist between the goals of terminating the pregnancy with minimal risk to the mother and protecting the fetal organs and tissues.
The use of organs from a fetus aborted whole also presents the
additional problem of determining when the aborted fetus is dead.
It is possible for the fetus to be aborted with signs of life2" and yet
20. Currently, most organs used in infant transplant operations come from
anencephalic infants. See The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at 18. col. 1; Capron,
supra note 3, at 5-8. For a discussion of infants with anencephaly, see Baird &
Sadovnick, Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 268
(1984). For a discussion of the ethical issues involved in infant organ donations see
Harrison & Meilaender, The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, 16 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 21 (1986) and Levine, Maguire & Warren, Can the Fetus be an Organ
Farm?, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (1978).
21. The gestational age of the fetus may be critical to the success of a transplant operation. Mahowald, supra note 3, at 10. To ensure the success of the operation, the method of abortion chosen must preserve the desired fetal tissues. Id. Abortion by hysterectomy produces the most usable organs because the fetus is removed
whole, but it also involves the greatest risk to a woman. Id. at 13. In contrast, dilation
and evacuation may be the safest method for the mother, yet it is the most destructive to the fetus and, therefore, may not produce the whole organs needed for a transplant operation. Id. (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PUB. HEALTH SERV., DEPT.
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 49 (Nov. 1980)).
22. The safest methods of abortion are dilation and curettage (D&C) or dilation
and evacuation (D&E). Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 624 (1986). In these procedures,
a mechanical evacuation of the uterus is performed by dilating the cervix and either
scraping or sucking the fetus out by a vacuum tube. Id. These procedures result in a
fragmentation of the fetus and, therefore, the possible destruction of the developing
organs desirable for transplantation. See id. at 625.
During the second trimester, the fetus is more developed and, therefore, the
mechanical evacuation of the uterus becomes dangerous. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIoETHICS 3 (W. Reich ed. 1978). During the second or third trimester, the fetus is
removed either surgically by hysterectomy or by medical evacuation. Id. In medical
evacuation, the doctor induces uterine contractions by injecting saline or prostaglandin. Id.
While 90% of abortions in America are performed by D&C or D&E during the
first trimester, doctors perform nearly 100,000 second trimester abortions each year.
Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J.
1451, 1455 (1984). The majority of these late abortions are sought by women who are
very young, poorly educated and of a low socio-economic class. Id. Other women may
choose a late abortion after amniocentesis reveals a fetal defect. Id. The possibility of
producing fetal organs for transplant operations may, however, give some women an
incentive to postpone an abortion procedure until later in their pregnancy, thereby
increasing the risk involved in the procedure. See Mahowald, supra note 3, at 13.
23. The Department of Health and Human Services has also, by negative impli-
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still, in the physician's determination, not be viable because it is not
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, [even] with artificial aid. '2 4 The urgent need for immediate removal of organs
from this pre-viable fetus presents a temptation to remove the organs while the fetus still shows signs of life. 5 Because the freshness
of the transplantable organs often determines the success of a transplant operation,26 it is possible for such concerns to adversely effect
the determination of fetal viability as well as the point when fetal
27
death occurs.

cation, defined "live fetus" through its definition of a dead fetus: "'Dead fetus'
means a fetus ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical
cord (if still attached)." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1986). In this definition, the four signs
used to determine whether a fetus is alive are: 1) the presence of a heartbeat; 2) the
presence of respiratory activity; 3) the spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles;
and 4) the pulsation of an attached umbilical cord. Id. See generally NATIONAL
COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, reprinted in

40

Fed. Reg. 33,530 Appendix 13, 9-11 (1976) [hereinafter Nat'l Comm'n Report] (dis-

cussing fetal life and death.) See also Rhoden, supra note 21, at 1476-78 (differentiating viable from non-viable infants).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (citing L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971) [hereinafter HELLMAN]; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965)). The Department of Health and
Human Services similarly defines viability as "being able, after either spontaneous or
induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of available medical therapy) to the
point of independently maintaining a heartbeat and respiration." 45 C.F.R. §
46.203(d)(1986). Because viability is determined by the available medical technology,
it does not occur at a predetermined point in the pregnancy. See Comment, Viability
and Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146 (1975). For example, at the time of the Roe decision in
1973, "viability" generally occurred as early as the 24th week of pregnancy. 410 U.S.
at 160 (citing HELLMAN, supra, at 493). In 1982, however, viability was medically defined as occurring as early as the 20th week of pregnancy. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1556 (24th ed. 1982).
Because of the difficulty of determining the point at which viability occurs,
courts will defer to the decision of the attending physician. Comment, supra, at 15154. In Roe, the Court held "when those trained in [the] discipline of medicine ... are
unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary ... is not in a position to speculate
as to when viability occurs." 410 U.S. at 159. This position was reaffirmed by the
Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In
Danforth, the Court held that viability was a flexible time that could vary in each

pregnancy and should, therefore, be determined by the attending physician. Id. at 64.
Allowing the physician to determine viability on a case by case basis is, however,
problematic because the most accurate method for determining gestational age the
basis for any informed decision about viability, has an error factor of plus or minus
five days. Lenow, supra note 18, at 11. See also Special Project, supra note 22, at
629-31 (discussing fetal viability); Nat'l Comm'n Report, supra note 22, at 123-31
(discussing live but non-viable fetuses).
25. See supra note 23 for a listing of criteria for determining fetal life ex utero.

26. Prottas, The Rules for Asking and Answering: The Role of Law in Organ
Donation, 63 U. DET.L. REV. 183, 184 (1984); Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead,
28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 889, 892 (1984). See also Capron, supra note 3, at 5 discussing the

reclassification of anencephalic infants as dead to allow swift removal of transplantable organs).
27. See Mahowald, supra note 3, at 14; Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 20, 1987, at
48, col. 1.
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This comment, however, focuses on a third controversy
presented by the use of fetal tissue for transplants and research: the
temptation for conception with the sole intent to abort and produce
transplantable organs and tissues.2 8 This scenario of using the womb
to maufacture organs is controversial because the ending of one
human life for the benefit of another is morally repugnant."' Additionally, an abortion for the express purpose of creating donative
material is not justified by. the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade, which recognized a woman's fundamental right to procure an abortion.80
II.

A.

DEFINING ABORTION

Mother's Right to Abortion

In determining the nature of a woman's interest in her aborted
fetus, it is first necessary to analyze the nature of a woman's right to
choose an abortion. The United States Supreme Court established a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade. 1 In Roe,
the Court looked to the United States Constitution's guarantee of
personal privacy.82 Although not expressly stated, the Court found

that a right of privacy (or more accurately stated, a right of personal

autonomy)"3 was implied from the Constitution's express guarantee
of rights." Contained within this broad right of privacy are certain
28. Physicians have recently reported inquiries by women who want to become
pregnant so that a subsequent abortion will produce organs and tissues for transplants. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 20, 1987, at 48, col. 1.
29. See supra note 19 for an analysis applying the Hippocratic Oath to this
scenario.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For this comment's interpretation of the Roe decision
see supra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
31. 410 U.S. 113.
32. Id. at 152-53. See infra note 35 for Supreme Court cases discussing personal
privacy.
33. In one of its first decisions recognizing an implied constitutional right to
personal privacy, the United States Supreme Court suggested this right was one of
personal autonomy. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In that
opinion, the Court held "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person ....
Id. at 251. In a subsequent decision, Justice Brandeis suggested that this "right to be let alone [was] the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally Special Project, supra note 22, at 82124 (applying mother's right of privacy to issues of procreation, abortion and child
rearing).
34. The Court found the right to privacy included in many of the Constitution's
express provisions. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969)) (first amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (fourth and fifth
amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights); Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the ninth amendment);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (first section of fourteenth amendment)).
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fundamental rights, such as the right to marry, procreate, and practice contraception. 5 The Roe Court concluded that the right to an
abortion was one of the fundamental rights contained within this
broader right of privacy. 6
The Court further defined the nature of a woman's right to an
abortion by listing the possible harms imposed upon a woman when
the state totally proscribed abortion. 3' The Court suggested that the
medical complications associated with pregnancy, the emotional distress due to maternity or additional offspring, the mental and physical burdens of child care (especially when the child is unwanted),
and the social stigma of unwed motherhood all constituted possible
harms imposed on a woman when a state denied her the right to
choose an abortion." A review of these harms, especially in light of
35. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (personal privacy extends to contraception)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (personal privacy extends to marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (personal privacy extends to family relationships); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (personal privacy extends to procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (personal privacy extends to
child rearing and education).
36. The Court held that these fundamental rights to privacy were "founded in
the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action." Id. at 153.
37. To determine the harms the Texas legislature sought to remedy, the Roe
Court reviewed Texas statutes that made it a crime to secure an abortion. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Texas statute states, in pertinent part:
Article 1191. Abortion
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or
shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her
consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By "abortion" is meant that the life
of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Article 1192. Furnishing the means
Whoever furnishes the means for procurring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.
Article 1193. Attempt at abortion
If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that
such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less
than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Article 1194. Murder in producing abortion
If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by
an attempt to effect the same it is murder.
Article 1196. By medical advice
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., arts. 1191-119 4, 1196 (Vernon 1961).
38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. See generally Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH.
L. REV. 1569, 1579-83 (1979) (relying on G. BOURNE & DANFORTH, PREGNANCY (rev. ed.
1975)) (listing some fifty minor complaints of physical discomfort normally associated
with pregnancy).

19881

The Intent Creation of Fetal Tissue

the right to personal autonomy under which they are classified, suggests that the mother's right to an abortion is one of disassociation
with the fetus and potential child.89 Conversely, a woman's decision
to continue her pregnancy may fairly be characterized as her consent to an intrusion on her personal autonomy through her acceptance of the harms that the Roe Court suggested accompany pregnancy.4 0 Viewed in this light, abortion is a termination of the
connection between the mother and the potential child. By terminating this connection and, thus, disassociating herself from the fetus, a woman alleviates all the harms listed by the Roe Court.4 1 The
Roe Court's implied definition of abortion supports this view of the
mother's right to an abortion as the right to disassociate herself
from her fetus.
Medical authorities define abortion as the termination of pregnancy, spontaneously42 or by induction 4 , prior to viability.44 After
39. The harms listed by the Roe Court focus on the effects of an unwanted
child, not an unwanted pregnancy. Notes and Comments Artificial Gestation: New
Meaning for the Right to Terminate Pregnancy, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 755, 766 (1979).
Putting a newborn infant up for adoption, for example, would remove an unwanted
child from the mother without terminating the potential life. Id.
This view of the right to an abortion as a right of disassociation rather than a
right to commit feticide is further supported by the Roe Court's suggestion that a
state proscription of abortion after viability would be permissible. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 666 (1986). After
viability, the distinction between termination of pregnancy and feticide becomes
meaningful because the destruction of the fetus becomes uncomfortably similar to
infanticide. Id. at 666-67.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists adopted a similar position in its 1976 policy statement. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcs 4 (W. Reich ed. 1978).
The policy statement announced the position that "abortion is a process of separating
conflicting parties and does not primarily aim at destruction of the fetus directly." Id.
40. Because the Roe Court held that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, her decision to continue the pregnancy becomes one of choice
and, therefore, is one of accepting her moral responsibilities to the fetus. Dougherty,
The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal Patients and Conflicts
with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 89, 106 (1985). See Regan, supra note 38, at
1611-18.
41. See supra note 37-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
harms associated with pregnancy.
42. Abortion is generally defined as "[g]iving birth to an embryo or fetus prior
to the stage of viability at about 20 weeks of gestation (fetus weighs less than 500
grams). A distinction is made between abortion and premature birth: premature infants are those born after the stage of viability has been reached but before full term.
Abortion may be either spontaneous (occurs from natural causes) or induced."
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 3 (24th ed. 1982). A spontaneous abortion is commonly known as a miscarriage. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 3 (W. Reich ed. 1978).
Unlike the legal definition of abortion, the medical definition does not necessarily
imply an intentional termination of pregnancy. Compare STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DicTIONARY 3 (24th ed. 1982) with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Special Project, supra note 32, at 624 (drawing distinction between medical and
legal definitions of abortion).
43. An induced abortion is the intentional termination of a pregnancy. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 3 (W. Reich ed. 1978). This termination usually describes the
removal of a growing embryo or fetus that is implanted in the uterus. See Id. at 626-
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viability, termination of pregnancy is termed delivery."5 Throughout
the Roe opinion, the Court appeared to follow this medical definition by using the terms abortion and termination of pregnancy interchangeably. 48 It is clear, however, that the Roe decision focused
on the intentional termination of pregnancy by induction. In fact,
Justice Blackmun stated the question presented in Roe as that of "a
woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.' ' 48 By referring
to an abortion as a termination of pregnancy, the Court implied that
the nature of a woman's right to an abortion is the right to terminate her relationship with the fetus."9
This definition of abortion as a termination of pregnancy, while
not crucial at the time of the Roe decision, becomes important in
light of recent advances in prenatal care. At the time Roe was decided, the limitations in prenatal care were such that abortion almost invariably resulted in the death of the fetus, thus making abortion synonymous with feticide. Therefore, terminating a pregnancy
28 (discussing function of the intrauterine contraceptive device ("I.U.D."); Id. at 3
(discussing salpingectomy and diagnostic uterine curettages).
Finally, an induced abortion, (i.e. a non-natural termination of pregnancy prior
to viability), may also be characterized as therapeutic or non-therapeutic. Id. A therapeutic abortion is often synonymous with a legal abortion because the physician performing the abortion was not prosecuted under criminal abortion statutes when the
life of the mother is in jeopardy. Id.
While birth control pills and I.U.D.'s may cause "abortion" in the technical sense
of a medical definition, this comment focuses on induced abortions of the fetus after
implantation in the uterus. This type of procedure was the subject of the decisions in
Roe v. Wade. See supra note 37 for a description of the Texas statute at issue in Roe.
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for various definitions of viability.
45. Delivery is "[tlhe passage of the fetus and the placenta from the genital

canal into the external world."

STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

372 (24th ed. 1982).

Delivery generally denotes a termination of pregnancy after the fetus reaches viability. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHics 2-3 (W. Reich ed. 1978).
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 129 (1973) (woman's right "to choose to
terminate her pregnancy") (emphasis added); Id. at 150 ("[sltate has legitimate interest in seeing . . .that abortion . . . is performed under circumstances that insure
maximum safety for the patient.") (emphasis added); Id. at 153 ("Fourteenth Amendment [ ] . . .is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy") (emphasis added); Id. at 154 ("right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision .
I.d");
d. at 163 ("patients' pregnancy should be terminated.") (emphasis added).
47. The Roe case involved a constitutional challenge to a Texas statute that
prohibited induced abortions. See supra note 37 for the text of the Texas Criminal
Abortion statute.
48. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
49. See generally Note, supra note 39, 763-68 (discussing the Roe decision as
the right to terminate pregnancy, not feticide).
50. Among the recent advances in medical technology are advances in the
method used to perform late abortions. In the early 1970's the only non-surgical
method of late abortion was saline amnioinfusion. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 1452.
This procedure destroys the placental and fetal actions that prevent uterine contractions, thereby inducing contractions to expel the fetus. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
3 (W. Reich ed. 1978). This procedure also kills the fetus. Rhoden, supra note 22, at
1452.
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by abortion also necessarily terminated the fetus' life."1
The definition of abortion as feticide, however, is not consistent
with the Supreme Court's definition." Today, advancing technology
in fetal transplantation, 53 in the development of an artificial womb,5

and in caring for extremely premature infants 5 presents several posThe use of saline injections was followed by the development of the hormone
prostaglandin which directly stimulates uterine contractions. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 3 (W. Reich ed. 1978). The use of prostaglandins became widespread in the
latter part of the 1970's and resulted in substantial increase in live births following
late abortions. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 1452 (citing Stubblefield, Noftolm,
Frigolette & Ryan, Laminaria Augmentation of Intra-Amniotic PG F2d for Mid-

trimester Pregnancy Termination, 10

PROSTAGLANDIN

413, 420 (1975)).

One medical authority suggests that an abortion using prostaglandin is about 40
times more likely to result in a live birth than an abortion using saline. Id. at 1458
(citing CATES & GRIMES, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY, IN SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTIONS
163, 171 (G. Berger, W. Brenner & L. Kieth eds. 1981)). For this reason, many physicians still use saline amnioinfusion to avoid live births, despite its greater risk of
complications for women. Id. at 1457-58.
51. One study showed that during 1973, the year of the Roe decision, live births
occurred in only .12% of abortions. Bok, Nathanson, Nathan & Walters, The Unwanted Child: Caring for the Fetus Born Alive After an Abortion, 6 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 10, 13-14 (1976). But c.f. supra note 50 (use of prostaglandin increases
chance of live birth from abortion).
52. Compare supra note 10 (legal and medical definitions of feticide) with
supra notes 39, & 46 (the Roe Court's implied definition of abortion as the termination of pregnancy, not feticide).
53. Post-implantational fetal transference involves the removal' of a fetus that is
implanted in the wall of one uterus and the subsequent re-implantation in another
uterus. Notes and Comments, supra note 39, at 756-59. Scientists have already successfully performed this procedure using lower mammals. Id. at 758. In one such experiment, fetal lambs in England were removed from their mothers, transferred to
the uteri of rabbits and flown to Africa. Id. at 759. Ten days later they were transferred to the uteri of African sheep and later born alive. Id. (citing Gourney, The
New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 273, 281 (1968)).
In humans, doctors are now able to transfer an embryo, prior to implantation,
from the uterus of one woman into the uterus of another woman. Rhoden, supra note
39, at 670-71. If scientists are able to develop a post-implantation procedure for the
transference of human fetuses, a viable alternative to traditional abortion procedures
would exist. Comment, supra note 39, at 767. Additionally, post-implantational transference could affect a woman's right to secure an abortion. See Rhoden, supra note
39, at 670-71. If the receiving woman is defined as "artificial aid." then the fetus
meets the requirements of viability, that is, potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb (albeit with artificial aid), and the state could proscribe the removal
of the fetus. See id. Such an interpretation is also possible with pre-implantation
fetal transference. Id.
54. An artificial womb is a man-made organ designed to house the developing
fetus. Notes and Comments, supra note 39, at 757 n.16 (citing L. KARP, GENETIC ENGINEERING: THREAT OR PROMISE?

161 (1976)). The artificial womb could provide a site

upon which the placenta could attach to provide the fetus with oxygen and nourishment. Id. An artificial womb could also provide a viable alternative to current abortion procedures and would affect the determination of fetal viability in much the
same way as post-implantation fetal transference. See supra note 53 for a discussion
of possible alternatives to abortion.
55. Since the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, doctors have made substantial
advances in neonatal intensive care. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 1461. Doctors can now
successfully treat infants of very low birth weight. Id. In 1965, only 10% of infants
weighing less than 1500 grams and suffering from respiratory distress syndrome lived,
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sible alternatives to the termination of a fetal life by abortion. The
focus of a woman's right to an abortion has thus shifted to the termination of the maternal-fetal relationship and away from the termination of a potential life.
B. State Interests
In establishing the fundamental right of a woman to choose to
terminate her pregnancy, the Roe Court also concluded that such a
right was not absolute." The Court expressly rejected the idea that
the fundamental right to an abortion entitled the woman to "termiwhile by 1979 the survival rate was 80%. Id. at 1462. In the early 1960's, infants
weighing 1001 to 1500 grams had less than a 50% chance of survival, while by 1981
the survival rate had risen to 80%. Id. at 1463. Even infants at 100 grams or less, who
had a 94% mortality rate in the 1960's, had an increased survival rate of nearly 50%
by 1981. Id.
Many of these increased survival rates are due to technological advances in respiration therapy. Id. at 1461. Doctors now use constant distending pressure to prevent
lung collapse in premature infants, as well as mechanical ventilation to prevent aproa
(cessation of breathing). Id. at 1461-62. Advances have also been made in feeding low
birth weight infants by a tube into either the stomach or the small intestine. Id. at
1462. Finally, the development of computerized tomography (c.t.-scan) and real time
ultrasound have allowed doctors to better diagnose and treat intraventricular hemorrhages before brain damage occurs. Id.
There are two important drawbacks to this new technology. First is the expense.
Id. at 1464. When the medical costs for those infants who do not survive are added to
the costs for those who do survive but require follow-up care, the average cost of
producing a normal survivor totaled $88,058 in 1978. Id. at 1465. The other drawback
is that, while the rate of survivors who suffer some handicap has decreased, a substantial number are, nevertheless, impaired. Id. at 1463. One study suggests that over
forty-one percent of survivors born weighing less than 1500 grams have some impairment. Id. (citing Sinclair, Torrance, Boyle, Horwood, Saigal & Sacket,, Evaluation of
Neonatal-Intensive-CarePrograms, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 489, 491 (1981).
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972). The Roe Court held the right to an
abortion is a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment empowers the federal government to invalidate state statutes that encroach on a person's right to life, liberty or property. J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416-17 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment reads: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In determining the validity of a challenged state statute, the federal court's standard of review is determined by the nature of the right the statute interferes with.
NOWAK, supra, 418-19. If the challenged statute infringes on an express constitutional
right, then the courts apply a strict scrutiny standard which requires that the statute
further a compelling state interest by the least intrusive means. Id. If, however, the
challenged statute infringes on a interest not recognized by the Constitution, then
courts apply a rational basis test, which only requires the showing of a reasonable
relationship between the statute and a legitimate state objective. Id. at 418. Therefore, even the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not absolute
because they are subject to state regulation following a showing of a compelling state
interest. Id. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (value of using strict scrutiny and rational basis
tests to implement constitutional protections).
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nate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way and for
whatever reason" she chose." The Court announced that states
might impose limitations on a woman's right to an abortion to further the state's interests in protecting both maternal health" and
the potential human life.59 The balancing of these conflicting state
interests with the rights of the mother became the framework for
the Roe Court's trimester system. 0
1. Protection of Maternal Health
In establishing the first pillar of its trimester framework," the
Court examined the state's interests in protecting maternal health.2
At the time of the Roe decision, the state of medical technology was
such that the mortality rate of a woman having an abortion during
the first third of the pregnancy was less than for a woman carrying
the fetus full-term." Because abortion posed no additional risk to
the mother, the Roe Court held that, during the first trimester, a
woman and her physician could make the abortion decision without
intrusive state regulation. 4 Following the end of the first trimester,
however, the Court found that the risk of maternal death from abortion was greater than that for full-term pregnancies. 5 The Roe
57. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
58. Id. at 159.
59. Id.
60. See Comment, Viability and Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146, 149 (1975).
61. 'The normal human gestational period is 266 days or 38 weeks. Comment,
Roe v.Wade and the Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMP.
L.Q. 715, 735-36 (1974). Fertilization of the ovum, however, normally occurs two
weeks after a woman's last menstrual period. Id. By dating pregnancy from a woman's last menstrual period (the gestational method), the pregnancy period is 40
weeks, with the actual age of the fetus being about two weeks less than the length of
the pregnancy. Id. If the pregnancy is dated from conception (the conceptual
method), the pregnancy term is 38 weeks and the age of the fetus coincides with the
length of the pregnancy. Id.
The Roe Court used the common, yet imprecise trimester division to establish
the point when the state could regulate abortions to protect maternal health. 410 U.S.
at 163. This first trimester/second trimester division was fixed at the twelfth week of
pregnancy. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11
(1983).
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
63. In 1973, doctors performed the relatively safe abortion methods of dilation
and curettage ("D&C"), and dilation and evacuation ("D&E"), routinely until the
twelfth week of pregnancy. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 644. See also supra note 22
(defining the D&C and D&E procedures). These procedures were less hazardous than
child birth. Rhoden, supra note 37, at 644.
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
65. In 1973, the only second trimester abortion method available was saline
amnioinfusion. Rhoden, supra note 39 at 644. This procedure was generally not performed until the sixteenth week of pregnancy. As a result, physicians simply did not
perform abortions during the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth weeks. Id. Second
trimester saline abortions were also more hazardous to a woman. Id. It was this clear
distinction between first and second trimester abortions that provided the Roe Court
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Court therefore concluded that the state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling after the first trimester and that,
at this point, the state could regulate abortion procedures." Such
regulations, however, must be reasonably related to the protection of
the mother's health and cannot be imposed for the protection of the
17
fetus.
2.

Protection of Potential Life

The second pillar in the Roe Court's trimester framework' s was
established at the point when the fetus reaches viability.69 The
Court adopted the medical definition of viability, which is that point
when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's
womb, albeit with artificial aid. ' 70 When the fetus reaches the point
of viability, it is no longer merely a potential life but, instead, a
sustainable life. The state's interest in protecting the fetus therefore
becomes compelling at this point and 7 1 according to the Roe court,
the state can then strictly regulate or proscribe abortion
altogether."
Although the Roe Court determined that the point of fetal viability was at the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy, it did
not expressly conclude that the state's interest in protecting the fetus became compelling only during the last trimester of pregnancy.7 3
with the justification for its first trimester pillar. Id.
Advancing medical technology has, however, blurred this clear distinction. In
1980, the D&E abortion method became more common than saline amnioinfusion
during the sixteen to twenty week period of pregnancy. Rhoden, supra note 22, at
1460. This has resulted in a reduction in the mortality rate for second trimester abortions and presented a challenge to the Roe Court's first trimester decision. Rhoden,
supra note 39, at 648. The Court, however, upheld Roe's original first trimester/second trimester division despite this change in the mortality rates by peremptorily
holding that the original distinction "continues to provide a reasonable legal framework for limiting a state's authority to regulate abortions." Akron, 462 U.S. at 429
n.11. This has led at least one commentator to suggest that the division was never
justified. See Rhoden, supra note 39, at 644-55.
66. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
67. Id.
68. The Roe Court established the second pillar at the point when the fetus
became viable. Id. At the time of the decision, medical authority found that viability
usually occurred between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eights weeks. Id. at 160 (citing L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971)). Today,
however, viability may occur much earlier. See supra note 56 and accompanying text
(advances in prenatal care provide for earlier viability).
69. See supra note 24 (definition of viability).
70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (citing L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24TH ED.
1965)).
71. Id. at 163.
72. Id. The Roe Court did hold, however, that a state could not proscribe abortions "necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164.
73. See Comment, supra note 61, at 149-50 ("viability is being interpreted as
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Instead, the Court aligned this second pillar of its "trimester"
framework with the medical definition of viability. In doing so, the
Court impliedly provided for advances in prenatal care by allowing
the second pillar to shift to an earlier point on the continuum of the
pregnancy."4 Recent advances in medical technology that have
caused viability to occur earlier in the pregnancy have, therefore,
redefined the point at which the state's interest in the potential life
becomes compelling.75 The effect, as Justice O'Connor has stated, is
that the Roe trimester framework may well be on a "collision course
'7 6
with itself."
C. Fetal Rights/MaternalDuties
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade established a
framework for balancing a woman's right to personal autonomy, as
encompassed in her fundamental right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy, against the conflicting state interests of protecting maternal health and potential life. 77 The Court's recognition of a woman's right to an abortion and the state's interest in protecting potential human life, however, implied two additional factors that
must be addressed. First, by recognizing the state's interest in protecting the potential human life of the fetus, the Court implied that
the fetus does, in fact, have a right to life.78 Second, in recognizing
shifting phenomenon, tied to the 24 to 28-week period only by the current state of
medical technology.").
74. This position is supported by court decision's that seek to interpret Roe's
"trimester" framework. In Wolfe v. Schroering, a 1974 Kentucky abortion statute
that prohibited abortions after the fetus reached viability was challenged because it
did not adhere to the rigid three month division of the original trimester framework
in Roe. 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974). The district court rejected the challenge
because "[a] close inspection of the language in the Roe decision reveal[ed] that the
Court spoke only of a single trimester, the first. The Court used no language to indicate that the stages of pregnancy ... were evenly divided." Id. at 635. Similarly, a
1974 Missouri abortion statute was challenged in part because it adopted a medical
definition of viability to establish when abortions could be prohibited, rather than
distinguishing prohibited abortions by a trimester method. Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court upheld the use of a
medical definition of viability and stated "it is not the proper function of the legislature or the court to place viability. . . at a specific point in the gestation period." Id.
at 64.
75. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (modern medical advances redefine the point of viability).
76. Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983), suggests that as the medical risks to a
woman undergoing an abortion are decreased, the first pillar of the Roe trimester
framework will be pushed to a later point in the pregnancy. Conversely, as medical
technology becomes better able to treat low birth weight infants, viability occurs earlier in the pregnancy and, therefore, the second pillar of the Roe framework is pushed
to an earlier point. Id. It is very possible then to envision a collision between these
two pillars of the Roe trimester system. Id. See Rhoden, supra note 22, at 1490-93.
77. See Dougherty, supra note 40, at 102; Comment, supra note 58, at 146-49.
78. Dougherty, supra note 40, at 103.
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that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy,

the Court also implied that a woman's decision to continue her pregnancy is a decision to accept the maternal duty to protect her fetus'
79
right to life.
1.

Fetal Rights

The Roe Court found that the state's interest in the potential
life becomes compelling at the point when the fetus can potentially
live outside the womb. In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the
contention that a fetus was a person as defined by the fourteenth

amendment s° and, therefore, that it was entitled to all fourteenth

amendment protections."1 The Court, however, declined to address
the issue of when life begins.82 Instead, the Court chose to determine
when the state's interest in that potential life becomes compelling. 8
The Roe Court held that the state has an interest in protecting
the potential life of the fetus throughout the entire pregnancy in the
same way that the state has an interest in protecting maternal
health throughout the entire pregnancy. s4 In utilizing the current
level of medical technology to establish the pillars of its trimester
system, the Roe court, however, only established the points during
the pregnancy when the competing interests become compelling, not
when the interests come into existence.8s In holding that the state
has an interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, the Roe
Court necessarily implied that the fetus has a right to life. 86 It is this
79. Id.
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
81. Defining a fetus as a person under the fourteenth amendment would, of
course, also provide constitutional protection of its right to life. Dougherty, supra
note 40, at 104.
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. As the Court stated "[w]hen those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id.
83. See supra note 52 disucssing the application of strict scrutiny tests in constitutional law.
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. The Court stated that "[tlhese interests are separate
and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a
point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling'." Id. at 162-63. The Court recognized the existence of these interests during pregnancy and then sought to determine
when they become compelling. Id.
85. The state's interest in protecting the mother from the medical harm of
abortion becomes compelling when abortion presents a greater risk to the mother
than childbirth. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (comparing the risks
of pregnancy to those of abortion). The state's interest in protecting the fetus' potential life becomes compelling at viability. See supra note 68 and accompanying text
(discussing the point of fetal viability).
86. In holding that states have a legitimate interest in protecting the potential
life of a fetus and that this interest becomes compelling at viability, the Roe Court
suggested that the fetus itself has a right to life and that at the point of viability this
right outweighs a woman's right to personal privacy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66. This
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right to life that the state has an interest in protecting and that
becomes compelling at the point of viability, thereby outweighing
any right of the mother's to personal privacy.87 Thus, Roe v. Wade
only established a framework for determining when the fetus' right
to life outweighs a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.88 The Court's decision necessarily implies that questions of
maternal health risks and fetal viability are determined by the current level of medical science.
2. Maternal Duties

The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade also implied that when a
woman decides to continue her pregnancy, she accepts a maternal
duty to protect the fetus' right to life.89 The Roe decision provides a
woman with an alternative to full-term pregnancy and also allows
argument is based on the fact that because the fetus is incapable of speaking for
itself, one of the legitimate interests the state has is to protect the potential life by
asserting the fetus' right to life. See Special Project, supra note 34, at 824.
Such a position is supported by recent court decisions extending fetal rights. In
Berger v. Weber, a Michigan court allowed an infant to sue for negligently inflicting
prenatal injuries. 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978). The Court held that a
"child has a right to begin life with a sound body and mind." Id. In Commonwealth v.
Cass, the Massachusetts Supreme Court defined homicide, in part, as the infliction of
prenatal injuries that result in the death of a viable fetus, whether it is born alive or
dead. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). The Cass court relied on its own previous decision holding that a viable fetus is a person for the purpose of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. Id. at 800, 467 N.E.2d at 1325 (relying on Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975)). Finally, in Summerfield v.
Supreme Court, Maricopa City, the parents of a viable fetus that was stillborn were
permitted to recover for wrongful death caused by a physician's negligence. 144 Ariz.
467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985). In its opinion, the Summerfield court noted that 32 jurisdictions allow a wrongful death cause of action when a viable fetus is stillborn as the
result of tortious negligence. Id. at 467-77 nn.5,6, 698 P.2d at 721 nn. 5,6.
87. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text discussing a woman's right to
personal autonomy. One justification for recognizing a compelling state interest in the
protection of potential life after viability is that abortion after viability is similar to
infanticide. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword:Toward a Model
of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973). Tribe suggests that viability does not signal "any morally significant change in the developing
human." Id. at 28. Instead, because the fetus is capable of life outside the mother, the
harm or death caused to it by abortion is similar to infanticide. Id. Therefore, "a
state wishing to prevent the killing of infants simply has no way to distinguish the
deliberate destruction of the latter from what is involved in post-viability abortions."
Id.
88. The state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life reflects the
fetus' right to life. It is this fetal right to life that is weighed against a woman's right
to personal autonomy and which becomes "compelling" at the point of viability. By
enforcing her right to personal autonomy over her fetus' right to life by choosing an
abortion, a woman terminates her parental relationship with her fetus. One effect of
ending this relationship should be to terminate a woman's right to execute an anatomical gift of the fetal organs. This result would ensure that the decision to conceive
and/or terminate a pregnancy is an exercise of a woman's fundamental privacy rights
and not a means of producing organs for harvest.
89. See Dougherty, supra note 40, at 196.
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her to exercise her right to personal autonomy by choosing an abortion. In establishing a legal alternative to full-term pregnancy, the
Court has made a woman's decision to continue her pregnancy more
an exercise of a free will." Because the decision to continue a pregnancy is an exercise of a woman's free choice, it may also be characterized as "an intervening act of proximate cause,"91 thus making a
woman accountable for her continued pregnancy. This conscious decision, made with the freedom to choose an alternative, necessarily
creates a greater moral responsibility of the mother for the fetus. 2
By choosing full-term pregnancy over abortion, therefore, the woman is affirmatively accepting the maternal responsibility that accompanies that decision. 8
Conversely, in viewing the decision to proceed with a pregnancy
as an election to assume maternal responsibilities, abortion may be
characterized as a rejection of these same maternal duties. The most
obvious maternal duty rejected when a woman decides to have an
abortion is that of protecting the rights of the child. 4 By choosing
abortion, a woman is, in effect, placing her right to personal autonomy above the fetus' right to life." The state must then intervene to
protect its compelling interest in protecting the fetus."
Thus, when a pregnant woman terminates her pregnancy by
90. The popular view of abortion as a viable alternative to full-term pregnancy
is supported by the growing number of abortions performed in the United States each
year. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 1455. In 1975, the number of legal abortions performed in the United States surpassed the one million mark for the first time, rising
to 1.27 million by 1977. Id. at 1455 n.29. These numbers may even be higher since it
is generally believed that not all abortions are reported. Id.
91. Curlender v. Bio-science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). In Curlender,a wrongful life action was brought against a testing laboratory on behalf of a girl born with Tay-Sach's disease. Id. at 815, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 480. The suit alleged that the girl's parents were incorrectly informed that
they were not carriers of the disease and, as a result, they did not seek an abortion.
Id. at 815-16, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 480. In allowing the cause of action, the court suggested that a patient's decision to continue a pregnancy would bring about additional
moral and legal responsibilities to the child. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The
Court held that if "parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy,
with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be born, that conscious
choice would provide an intervening act of proximate cause . . .[and] these parents
[should be] answerable for the pain [and] suffering ...they have wrought upon their
offspring." Id.
92. Dougherty, supra note 40, at 106.
93. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth,69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437 (1983).
94. See Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the
"Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARV. J. ON LEoxs 137, 145-46 (1983).
95. See supra 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of a fetus'
right to life with a woman's right of personal autonomy).
96. While... [the child] 'belongs' to his parents, he belongs also to his state ...
[t]he fact [that] the child belongs to the state imposes upon the state many
duties. Chief among them is the duty to protect his right to live and to grow up
with a sound mind in a sound body and to brook no interference with that
right by any person or organization.
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an abortion, it is an intentional disassociation of herself from
the fetus, and a rejection of her maternal duties, with a corresponding loss of any and all the maternal rights she might otherwise have in the fetus.
Summary
The Roe Court delineated the right to an abortion by balancing
the rights of a woman against the interest of the state as protector
of the fetus' right to life. While the constitutional right to privacy
encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion, this right is not
absolute and must be exercised in light of the fetus' right to life.97 A
woman's conscious decision to terminate her pregnancy is a justifiable rejection of the maternal responsibilities associated with a fullterm pregnancy. However, by exercising her decision of free choice
and rejecting any maternal responsibilities, it follows that the
mother also relinquishes any parental rights that are associated with
the decision to carry the fetus to a full-term pregnancy." Such parental rights include her possessory interests in the fetus and her
right to donate the fetal tissue.
III.

POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE ABORTED FETUS

When a woman becomes pregnant with the intention of donating her aborted fetus for use in a transplant operation or for experimentation, it is with the assumption that she will have control over
the disposition of her fetus. Such a right to oversee the disposition
of the fetus arises out of the same possessory interest the parent has
in a deceased child. 9 If, however, abortion is correctly viewed as a
Shapiro, supra note 94, at 146 (citing In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E. 2d
128, 132 (1962)). When applied to post-viability abortions, this position seems to
place a duty on the states to intervene on behalf of a viable fetus and to prohibit the
abortion in such cases. In pre-viability abortions, which would operate as a termination of parental duties, the state would again have a duty to intervene and assume
responsibility for disposition of the fetal remains.
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text discussing the balancing of a woman's right to privacy against fetus' right to life.
98. See infra notes 94, 135-59, and accompanying text discussing the rejection
of parental rights.
99. The right to direct the disposition of a fetus flows from the possessory interest that the next of kin has in directing the burial of the human remains of a de-

ceased relative. See H.

BERNARD, THE LAW

OF DEATH

AND

DIsPosAL

OF THE DEAD

13-21

(2d ed. 1979). The next of kin's possessory interest in the disposal of human remains
arose from the English common law recognition of the next of kin's duty to dispose of
the dead body. See The Queen v. Stewart, 113 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1840) (duty to provide
the deceased with proper burial); see also Rees v. Huges, 1 K.B. 517 (1946) (burial
expense to be born by decedent's estate).
American courts have also found that a right to possession of the deceased's remains arises from the next of kin's duty to bury. See Nichols v. Central Vt. Ry. Co.,
94 Vt. 14, 16, 109 A. 905, 906 (1919). The duty of disposal and, therefore, right to
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disassociation of the mother from the fetus, a question arises as to
what parental rights, if any, the mother retains in the aborted fetus.
This section analyzes the possessory interest involved in the disposition of a human body and suggests that a woman's decision to abort
her fetus operates as a rejection of all her parental rights. 00
A. Common Law Possessory Interests
Under common law, the next of kin of a deceased person is entitled to the possession of the dead body. 01 The reason for this rule01
is that the state's interest in protecting both the public health and
the emotional well-being of the surviving family is generally best
served when the next-of-kin have possession of the deceased. 10 3 The
state has an interest in protecting the living from the possibility of
disease associated with improper disposal of remains, as well as protecting the living from the emotional and sensory offense associated
with improper disposal.0 4
With these concerns in mind, courts have recognized that close
relatives of the deceased have a quasi-property right to possession of
a dead body'0 5 for the purpose of burial because such a right or duty
of burial promotes the state's interest in two ways. First, family
members will, in most cases, willingly assume the duty of proper disposition because of their emotional ties with the deceased. 06 The
sense of sacredness in a human corpse, felt especially by the close
relatives of the deceased, will most likely ensure a decent disposal
according to the individual's religious or traditional customs.0 7
While this observance of a decent burial will most likely ensure swift
direct disposition of a fetus falls to the parents. See e.g., Wilde v. Milwaukee Elec.
Ry. & Light Co, 147 Wis. 129, 132, 132 N.W. 885, 886 (1911); Przybyszewski v. Metropolitan Dade County, 363 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
100. See supra notes 91 & 94 and accompanying text discussing abortion as a
rejection of parental rights.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text discussing the possessory interest of the next of kin in the body of the deceased.
102. Terry, "Alas! Poor Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39
VAND. L. REV. 419, 433 (1986) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
An entitlement is defined as a "[flight to benefits, income or property which may not

be abridged without due process."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

477 (5th ed. 1979).

103. Terry, supra note 102, at 433.
104. Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 889, 901-04
(1984).
105. Although reluctant to find a true property right in a dead body, courts
have recognized a quasi-property right in order to determine custody for burial. Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc. 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-5, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483-84
(1964). See also Quay, supra note 104, at 901-04.
106. See Quay, supra note 104, at 901-02.
107. See generally id. at 904-10 (discussing a family's obligation to follow the
decedent's wishes for proper burial).
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disposal of the remains, it is also likely that a close relative may
already be in possession of the dead body and, therefore, the disposal can be accomplished with a minimum of body transactions.0 s
The second reason for placing the duty of proper disposition of
human remains on the family is that it will, in most cases, fairly
allocate the costs of disposal. It is likely that these close relatives
upon whom the duty of disposal is generally placed will stand to
benefit from the decedent's estate.1 9 Some of the benefits from the
estate can, therefore, easily be allocated to cover the costs of burial, 110 especially when there is an obligation on the family to observe
the potentially costly burial and disposition wishes of the
deceased."'
With respect to fetal remains, this same type of reasoning also
supports the quasi-property possessory, interest the mother has in
the fetal remains of her "child." While it is unlikely that a fetus will
possess an estate, the benefits of which the next of kin can use to
cover the cost of burial, the emotional ties between family members
are enough to ensure a swift and decent disposal."' When a pregnant woman intentionally aborts her fetus, however, she rejects
those emotional ties and abandons the fetus together with her possessory interest in the remains.
B.

Statutes and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

In addition to the common law possessory interests in the
aborted fetus, specific state legislation,"' as well as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"),'4 regulates the uses of the aborted fetus. Much of the applicable state legislation appears in the area of
fetal research.'" Conversely, the UAGA regulates human organ and
tissue donations."16 As applied to the abortus,"' these laws generally
108. Terry, supra note 102, at 433-34.

109. The Uniform Probate Code distributes the estate of an intestate decedent
to a living spouse and/or the decedent's lineal descendants according to the closeness
of their relationship to the decedent. UNIF PROs. CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103, 8 U.L.A. 59-61
(1983). This distribution is designed to follow the desires of most decedents. UNs'.
PROB. CODE at § 2-102 comment 8 U.L.A. at 59. Unless the decedent executes a valid
will altering this distribution, the close relatives of the decedent will take from his
estate.
110. Terry, supra note 102, at 434.
111. See supra note 106 for a discussion of the next of kin's obligation to provide burial.
112. Terry, supra note 106.
113. See Terry, supra note 100, at 427-32.
114. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
U.A.G.A. operates).

115. See Terry, supra note 100, at 440-56.
116. U.A.G.A. 8A U.L.A. 16 prefatory note (1983).
117. An abortus is simply "[t]he fruit of an abortion ...
TIONARY 7 (5th ed. 1979).
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do not address the possessory interests in the remains, but instead
regulate the market for aborted fetuses.
State legislation focuses on either slowing the growth of the fetus market or on a total proscription of fetal experimentation.'
States control the uses of fetal tissue by regulating storage and
transportation, by limiting those who may receive the aborted fetus,
and by prohibiting its sale.' 9 Such legislation, however, does not
prohibit a woman from intentionally conceiving with the intent to
use the fetal organs or tissues for transplant purposes.120 A strict
prohibition on fetal experimentation poses problems in distinguishing permitted research from prohibited experimentation.' 2 ' An additional concern is the effect such a proscription would have in limit122
ing advances in prenatal care.

With the development of transplant technology, the UAGA was
proposed and quickly adopted by all fifty states.2 3 The purpose of
the UAGA is to harmonize the competing interests of donors, donees
and recipients in the donative tissue and answer the legal questions
124
arising from the conflict between these competing interests.
Under the UAGA, a decedent includes a fetus or a stillborn infant. 1 5 The UAGA further provides that the parties with the right
to donate remains are, in descending order of priority, either a parent, an adult sibling, the guardian of the decedent at the time of his
death, or any other person authorized or with a duty to dispose of
118. Terry, supra note 100, at 437-38. See generally Fletcher & Schulman, Fetal Research: The State of the Question, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6 (Apr. 1985)
(reviewing current statutes on fetal research).
119. Terry, supra note 102, at 437-38.
120. Robertson, supra note 93, at 405-07 (a woman has a constitutional right to
procreate).
121. Terry, supra note 102, at 441-42. See generally Nat'l Comm'n Report,
supra note 23, app. 13 (reviewing the law of fetal research); Id. at app. 14 (review of
the legal issues in fetal research).
122. See Fletcher and Schulman, supra note 120, at 8-11; Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, 15 HASTING CENTER REP. 12 (Apr. 1985).
123. Comment, supra note 19, at 742.
124. Quay, supra note 26, at 896-900. The U.A.G.A. suggests five competing interests in the donation of organs. 8A U.L.A. 16 prefatory note (1983). They are:
(1) the wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the disposition of
his body; (2) the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the interest
of the state in determining by autopsy, the cause of death in cases involving
crime or violence; (4) the need of autopsy to determine the cause of death
when private legal rights are dependent upon such cause; and (5) the need of
society for bodies, tissues and organs for medical education, research, therapy
and transplantation.
Id.
The prefatory note also recognized twelve specific legal questions arising from
organ transplantation for which the U.A.G.A. provided answers. Id. at 16-17. These
questions include how consent is obtained, how the gift is executed, how death is
defined, and the nature and extent of the physician's liability. Id.
125. § l(b), 8A U.L.A. 30 (1983).

19881

The Intent Creation of Fetal Tissue

the remains.126 Just as at common law, under the UAGA a mother
retains a possessory interest in the fetal remains, and has the right
to execute an anatomical gift of the fetal organs and tissue.
This right to consent to donation of fetal organs should not be
viewed as absolute. Case law has established that maternal consent
is not in and of itself sufficient to allow a minor child or legal incompetent to become an organ donor. 127 In addition to necessary parental consent, the courts have held that the parents must prove a benefit to the donor before such consent is effective. 2 s Applying this
rule of law to the fetal donor, the parents would need to prove some
benefit to the fetal donor in order to justify the anatomical gift of
fetal organs and tissue. Because the use of such tissue and organs
presupposes the death of the donor-fetus, it is quite impossible to
establish any benefit to the fetus from the donation.
The common law possessory interest in a dead body, as well as
the statutory right to execute an anatomical gift under fetal experimentation legislation and the UAGA, address the maternal rights of
a woman to direct the disposal of her fetus. 2 9 The question arises,
however, whether those rights exist when a woman chooses to abort
her fetus for the purpose of making the fetal organs and tissues
available for transplantation. Because the right to an abortion arises
from a woman's fundamental right to personal autonomy, proceeding with an abortion represents a conscious decision to exercise that
right over the fetus' corresponding right to life. 2 ' A woman's decision to put her personal autonomy ahead of her maternal duties to
the fetus implies that she has rejected those maternal duties. Because abortion is a rejection of the fetus, it therefore operates as a
legal abandonment." When a woman has an abortion, she necessarily rejects all maternal rights, including the right to direct the disposition of the fetal remains.132
126. § 2, 8A U.L.A. at 34-35.
127. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (affirming equitable order
allowing kidney transplant from mental incompetent to his brother).
128. In Strunk, the court used the "judgment doctrine" to permit the mother of
a 27 year old mental incompetent to consent to the incompetent's donation of one of
his kidneys to his 28 year old brother who was dying from kidney disease. Id. See
Lenow, supra note 19, at 19, n.112. The court allowed the operation because the Department of Health demonstrated that the incompetent was emotionally and psychologically dependent on his brother and, therefore, the death of his brother would
cause more severe harm then the loss of the kidney. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146.
129. See supra notes 99 & 128 discussing a mother's right to direct the disposal
of a dead fetus.
130. See supra note 85 and accompanying text discussing the right to an abortion as the result of balancing a woman's right to privacy against the fetus' right to
live.
131. See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text discussing abortion as
abandonment.
132. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ter-
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ABORTION AS ABANDONMENT

A woman's decision to intentionally conceive with the intent to
abort the fetus and execute an anatomical gift of the fetal organs
and tissues raises the ethical dilemma of ending a potential human
life solely for the medical benefit of another."8' This issue has stirred
controversy in the area of organ transplants, most notably in determining the time of death of the donor. 4 The determination of fetal
death for transplant purposes becomes increasingly complex because
the mother has a constitutionally protected right, grounded in her
right to privacy, to the conception and abortion of the fetus.185 Legislation that presents an outright ban on fetal donation or seeks to
regulate the use of fetal tissue is problematic in its application.
While such legislation may prevent exploitation of the fetus, it poses
a severe limitation on the benefits obtained from current research
and treatments that utilize fetal tissues. 36 By viewing induced abortion as a termination of all maternal rights and, therefore, also as an
abandonment of the fetus, the states can retain and closely regulate
the benefits of this new technology while, at the same time, preventing the use of the womb as a spare parts factory."'7
A. Termination of Maternal Rights by Abandonment
Applying the principles of adoption law to the abortion scenamination of parental rights.
133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of ethical violations of the Hippocratic Oath and implications the thirteenth amendment's proscription of involuntary servitude.
134. About 90% of neurosurgeons are in favor of brain death criteria being used
to determine legal death. Prottas, supra note 25, at 189. A brain-dead patient is best
suited to become an organ donor because the patient's heart can continue to pump
and, therefore, sustain the body's organs. Id. at 184. Brain death presumes that "irreversible changes have taken place that preclude return to normal brain activity and
self-sustaining bodily function." U.A.G.A. § 7 comment, 8A U.L.A. 60 (1983). This definition is problematic if applied to a developing fetus in order to determine whether
its organs may be removed because a developing fetus has the potential to develop
"normal brain activity and self-sustaining bodily functions." Id. See Capron, supra
note 3, at 5-9 (arguing that anencephalic infants should not be classified as braindead to facilitate transplants).
135. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text discussing a woman's constitutionally protected right to procreative freedom.
136. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text for a list of harms caused
by a total ban on fetal research.
137. Such a model would not present an intrusion on a woman's right to privacy
because she would still have the procreative rights to practice contraception and to
choose abortion. This model would, however, prevent a woman from exercising her
procreative rights for the unethical production of transplantable tissues because the
act of inducing an abortion would terminate her parental right to direct disposition.
Viewing abortion as a termination of the right to direct disposition of the fetal organs
would, therefore, eliminate the woman's incentive to consider such a procedure (or to
even consider conceiving as a means to that end).
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rio, the aborted fetus can reasonably be viewed as an abandoned
child. 38 According to the Uniform Adoption Act ("UAA"), consent
to adoption is not required when the natural parents have abandoned their child. 189 In defining abandonment, most courts have
used a strict interpretation that requires physical abandonment, "as
well as the subjective intent to relinquish parental ties.""" The UAA
has, however, liberalized the definition of abandonment by requiring
only physical abandonment.""
A woman's act of procuring an abortion is tantamount to a
physical abandonment of the fetus. By removing a pre-term fetus
from her womb with the intent to donate the fetal organs and tissues, the mother has evidenced her withdrawal of support from the
fetus. " 2 Removal of the fetus to harvest its organs is no less of an
138. This view of aborted fetus as abandoned infant is integrated into part of
Tennessee's abortion law. The applicable sections state: "Custody of infant prematurely born alive during abortion. An infant prematurely born alive in the course of a
voluntary abortion is hereby declared abandoned for purposes of custody only and
the department of human services shall care for such infant as provided for in s34106." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-4-207 (1982).
This statute, however, applies only to a fetus that is aborted alive. Id. Consequently, if the fetus showed no signs of life following the abortion procedure, the
statute would not apply and the mother would retain the right to direct disposition of
the fetal remains. Id. However, the mere act of securing an abortion should also terminate the mother's right to direct disposition, whether the fetus shows signs of life
or is killed when removed from the womb.
139. UNuF. ADOPTION AcT. § 6, 9 U.L.A. 26-27 (1971) (hereinafter U.A.A.). Subsection (a) of section six states:
(a) Consent to adoption is not required of:
(1) a parent who has [deserted a child without affording means of identification, or who has] abandoned a child;
(2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the parent for a period of at
least one year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as
required by law or judicial decree.
Id.
140. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Promise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REy. 879, 895 (1984) (citing In re T.C.M., 651 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Adoption of Ernst, 318 N.W.2d 353 (S.D. 1983); In re Adoption of Tyron, 27 Wash.
App. 842, 621 P.2d 775 (1980) (additional citations omitted).
141. No consent to adoption is required when the parent of a child unjustifiably
fails to significantly communicate with the child or provide care and support for the
period of one year. U.A.A. § 6(a)(2). Similarly, some state statutes, do not require a
showing of subjective intent to prove abandonment. Bartlett, supra note 137 at 896
(citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982); GA. CODE § 19-8-6(b) (1982); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-1-6(g)(1) (Burns 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-111(1)(a)(iii-v), 41-3102(3)(d) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:5(I) (1977); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
111(6)(b) (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2(1)(b) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (A) (Page Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a) (Supp. 1083);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-5 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(1)(b) (West Supp. 19831984)).
142. In the same way an infant is totally dependent upon its mother for its
nutrition, protection and care, a fetus in the womb is also dependent upon its mother.
In fact, because of the physical link between the fetus and the mother via the umbili-
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abandonment than leaving an infant on a stranger's doorstep. An
intentionally induced abortion is clearly a withdrawal of physical
support and therefore must legally constitute a physical abandon14 3
ment of the fetus by the mother.
When determining whether an intentional abortion provides evidence of the mother's intent to relinquish parental ties, the reason
for the abortion need not be examined. The Supreme Court requires
clear and convincing evidence for the termination of parental ties. "4
Here, however, the clear and convincing evidence of the mother's
intent to abandon the fetus is implied from her unambiguous act of
procuring an abortion.4 5 Parental intent to sever ties with a child
can be shown by actions that severely harm the child. Such intent is
found when a parent is determined unfit because his or her actions
have caused severe harm to the child." 6 A woman's act of withdrawing her support of the fetus through abortion goes well beyond the
infliction of severe harm to the child. Moreover, when abortion is
viewed as a disassociation of a woman from her fetus,4 the intent
to terminate parental ties is clearly evident.
B.

The Effect of Abandonment

In adoption law, the abandonment of a child operates as a complete termination of all parental rights to that child without parental consent. In effect, the parents and the child become legal strangers."" The effect of this legal severing of parental rights is to
discharge the parents from duties of care and support of the child."O
The parents' rights to the disposition of the body of the deceased
50
child are also severed.
cal cord, the fetus' dependence upon its mother is even more evident. Because abortion, correctly viewed, is a severing of the physical link between the mother and the
fetus, abortion itself is evidence of the mother's withdrawal of support.
143. Abandonment, as pertaining to children, is legally defined in part as a
"[floregoing [of] parental duties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 3 (5th ed. 1979). The initial parental duty, or more accurately, maternal duty, is to protect the fetus' right to
life. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text for an explanation of maternal
duty to protect the fetal right to live. Abortion is clearly a rejection of this parental
duty and, therefore, is correctly characterized as abandonment of the fetus. Id.
144. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
145. By definition, the subjective intent of abandonment is proved by objective
actions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (5th ed. 1979).
146. See e.g., Ford v. Litton, 211 So. 2d 871, 873 (Miss. 1968) (requiring a showing of "immoral conduct or vicious habits" to prove unfitness); D.S. v. Department of
Pub. Assistance & Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980) (unfitness determined
by actions imposing a "serious danger to the child's physical or mental well-being").
147. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text discussing abortion as a disassociation of a woman from her fetus.
148. Bartlett, supra note 143, at 894.
149. See U.A.A. § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 44 (1971).
150. See Phillips v. Home Undertakers, 138 P.2d 550 (Okla. 1943). In Phillips,
the Court held that after the legal termination of a father's rights to his child by
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If adoption law theory is applied to an intentionally induced
abortion, the aborted fetus may be fairly characterized as abandoned by the mother. The induced abortion severs the maternal ties
to the fetus and the mother should therefore no longer retain a common law possessory interest in the fetal remains. 51 Such a severance
of the maternal ties also removes the mother from the class of persons possessing rights to execute donations of fetal tissue under the
UAGA.1" 2 The fetus is then viewed as abandoned and the state can
step in to protect it accordingly. 5
By viewing the aborted fetus as under the state's parens patriae control,"" the benefits of using aborted fetuses are retained
without allowing the mother to intentionally conceive and later harvest the fetus. Temptations for a woman to intentionally conceive a
fetus for use as an organ donor may arise from the possibility of
financial gain, or, more likely from the possibility of directing donations .toward a family member or friend. Either case presents the
possibility of ending one life for the benefit of another. 5 In such
cases, the justifications which support a woman's fundamental right
to an abortion are not implicated because personal autonomy is no
longer the reason for securing the abortion. 56 Instead of securing an
abortion for the purpose of exercising control over her own body, the
mother's reason for abortion becomes control over the body of the
fetus. Because an aborted fetus is abandoned, however, a woman's
maternal rights, including the right to direct disposition of the fetal
remains, are severed and the state may regulate to ensure that the
sole reason for choosing an abortion is to exercise a woman's constitutionally protected right of personal autonomy.1 5 7 Without control
over the disposition of the fetal remains, the mother can neither receive financial gain from the aborted fetus nor direct its disposition
to a predetermined transplant recipient. The state, however, can
divorce decree, the father had no duty to provide for the burial of the child.
151. See supra note 99 and accompanying text for a discussion of a mother's
possessory interest in fetal remains.
152. See supra note 128 and accompanying text for a discussion of persons who
may execute organ donations.
153. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a suggestion that the state
has a duty to protect the fetus' right to life.
154. Parens patriae is the state's power to "act as guardian to persons with
legal disabilities such as infants." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). See
also Comment, 95 THE L.Q. REV. 332 (July 1979) (suggesting the parens patriae
power of Family Division of the High Court in England could justify wardship of a
fetus to prevent abortion).
155. See supra note 19 and accompanying text discussing the application of the
Hippocratic Oath to the ethical question of taking one life for the benefit of another.
156. See supra note 33 and accompanying text discussing the constitutional origins of the right to personal privacy.
157. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a characterization of abortion as a disassociation of the mother from the fetus.
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control the disposition of the fetus by more closely regulating the
use of the remains for beneficial experimentation and treatments.
V.

CONCLUSION

Recent advances in the area of transplant technology and in the
treatment of some diseases have created new uses for fetal organs
and tissues. These uses have created the temptation for a woman to
intentionally conceive a fetus in order to obtain an abortion and use
the fetal organs and tissues as donative material. The problem is
whether a woman's constitutional right to procreate and secure an
abortion allows her to end the potential life of the fetus for the benefit of others. An affirmative answer is not compelled by the rationale behind the Supreme Court's legalization of abortion as an exercise of a woman's right to personal autonomy. It also raises the
ethical dilemma of whether a person should be able to end a potential human life solely for the benefit of others.
Recent advances in medical technology have, however, led to a
greater understanding of fetal viability and, correspondingly, to an
increase in the rights afforded the fetus. In the wake of these advances, the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
is, in essence, a decision balancing the mother's right to personal
autonomy against the fetus' right to life. In addition, a woman's conscious decision to secure an abortion is a clear rejection of any maternal duties. As an unambiguous act of physical abandonment,
abortion terminates the woman's parental rights and duties, including the right to direct the disposition of the fetal remains.
By intentionally inducing an abortion, the mother should also
lose her right to execute qn anatomical gift of the fetal organs or
tissues. Such an approach would remove the incentive for intentionally creating fetal organs as donative material, regardless of whether
the incentive is profit or a purely altruistic reason. The benefits of
using the tissues of aborted fetuses, however, may be retained by
allowing the state to direct and regulate the disposition of the
aborted fetus. Such a view of abortion prevents the intentional creation of fetal tissue for transplants and does not permit the fetus to
become a mere harvested crop.

James David Roberts

